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Abstract	
While science is taken to differ from non-scientific activities in virtue of its 
methodology, metaphysics is usually defined in terms of its subject matter. 
However, many traditional questions of metaphysics are addressed in a variety of 
ways by science, making it difficult to demarcate metaphysics from science solely in 
terms of their subject matter. Are the methodologies of science and metaphysics 
sufficiently distinct to act as criteria of demarcation between the two? In this 
chapter we focus on several important overlaps in the methodologies used within 
science and metaphysics in order to argue that focusing solely on methodology is 
insufficient to offer a sharp demarcation between metaphysics and science, and 
consider the consequences of this for the wider relationship between science and 
metaphysics. 
 
1. What	are	science	and	metaphysics?	
Can we distinguish science from metaphysics? Traditionally, metaphysics is defined as 
the most general study of reality, concerned with the actual and possible, essences 
and potentialities, identities and priority relations. Science, on the other hand, is 
qualified as the study of the natural or physical or actual world. Already we face 
problems here: what is ‘natural’ and ‘physical’ if not just that which can be 
scientifically studied? Take any candidate for something non-physical or non-natural 
(e.g. ghosts, souls, spirits, and the like): if there were some way of reliably measuring 
it, then it would presumably be of relevance to science. Thoughts such of these raise 
scepticism as to whether metaphysics and science can be distinguished solely in 
terms of their subject matter. Although the subject matters of science and 
metaphysics may indeed overlap, it is reasonable to suppose that the disciplines may 
be distinguished in terms of their methodologies, particularly with respect to the 
empirical nature of the scientific method that has no obvious analogue in 
metaphysics.  In the present chapter, we go further and make the case against a 
clear-cut methodological distinction between science and metaphysics. One might 
think that metaphysics is a purely conceptual, a priori, or ‘armchair’ discipline, 																																																								
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whereas scientists are in the lab or the field, employing a distinctive empirical method 
that all and only sciences share, but the reality is much less clearly structured, with a 
variety of non-empirical methods shared by both metaphysicians and scientists in 
attempts to answer similar foundational questions about the world. In what follows 
we investigate different methodologies employed within science and metaphysics, 
both analytic and naturalistic, and argue that when it comes to methodology, there is 
a substantial overlap between science and metaphysics that undermines a sharp set 
of demarcation criteria between the two disciplines.  
 
1.1. 	What	is	science?	
Science is standardly understood to differ from non-scientific activities in terms of its 
method. Much of early 20th century philosophy focused on identifying the scientific 
method and offering necessary and sufficient conditions for a discipline to constitute 
science as opposed to non-science or pseudo-science. The logical positivists 
employed a verificationist criterion of meaning, arguing that scientific statements are 
meaningful insofar as they are empirically verifiable, as opposed to metaphysical 
statements. Karl Popper (1963) argued that the scientific method is falsificationist as 
opposed to verificationist; although some scientific statements, such as universal 
generalisations, are not clearly verifiable through empirical means, it should be 
possible to falsify them through some empirical test. Thomas Kuhn (1970) offered a 
broader perspective on the demarcation problem and scientific methodology, taking 
genuine science to offer its own puzzle-solving tools that advance the scientific 
paradigm. Imre Lakatos (1977) appealed to the ability of scientific theories to make 
novel predictions to be what demarcates science from pseudo-science and to be a 
genuinely distinctive feature of progressive science. In attempting to resolve the 
demarcation problem and overcome objections raised against existing accounts, Paul 
Thagard (1978) offered a historical and social perspective on the question by focusing 
of the very practitioners of science. For Thagard, it is not only that pseudoscientific 
theories are less progressive than their competitors, but the very community of 
practitioners make little attempt at resolving problems endemic to their positions. On 
this account, demarcation is no longer an absolute matter but becomes contextual: 
evaluating the methods and approaches a community follows when addressing 
certain questions can make a theory scientific at one time and pseudoscientific at 
another.  
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In the contemporary debate in philosophy of science, it is widely acknowledged that 
all such attempts to offer a set of necessary and sufficient conditions to demarcate 
science from non-science face a series of foundational problems. Many philosophers 
of science instead take science to adopt a plurality of methods, and that the 
relationship between science and non-science is resolved only when a more 
contextual approach is taken. What about metaphysics? Can we provide demarcation 
criteria for metaphysics, and is its methodology a helpful place to start looking?  
 
1.2. 	What	is	metaphysics?	
While once taken to constitute a single activity, science and metaphysics are now 
taken to be two very different disciplines. While science aims at making precise 
predictions about the physical world, metaphysics is taken to study questions of 
broader significance and generality. For instance, we turn to physics to predict where 
our planet will be with respect to the sun in a month’s time; we turn to biology to 
understand the evolutionary difference between a sugar glider and a flying squirrel; 
we turn to metaphysics to address questions like “What is the essence of X?”, “Are 
there universal properties?”, “How do we understand actuality and possibility?”, 
“What are the fundamental ontological categories?”, etc.. While many questions of 
metaphysics are clearly outside the scope of science, some central questions, such as 
“Does time pass?” and “How does the mental relate to the physical?” are taken to fall 
under the study of both science and metaphysics, paving the way for what is 
commonly called naturalistic metaphysics. When it comes to questions of 
composition, finding a fundamental level to reality, or understanding time, modern 
science — whether physics, empirical psychology or biology — can contribute 
towards highly non-trivial answers. Naturalistic metaphysicians take science to 
provide the basis for their investigations, prescribing that we should read our 
metaphysics from our contemporary science, and answer questions about the 
fundamental nature of the world by appealing to fundamental physics (Ladyman and 
Ross (2007); Maudlin (2007); Ney (2012); French and McKenzie (2012; 2015); 
Morganti and Tahko (2017)). In this way, naturalistic metaphysics takes scientific 
theories to play a primary role in addressing many paradigm metaphysical questions. 
 
On the other hand, analytic metaphysicians often see the relationship between 
science and metaphysics to be the other way around, with metaphysics being an 
autonomous area of study that determines the conceptual background that makes 
science possible. For instance, the metaphysician E.J. Lowe (2002, p. vi) holds that 
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“metaphysics goes deeper than any merely empirical science, even physics, because it 
provides the very framework within which such sciences are conceived and related to 
one another.” On the positive side, one can see an analogy here between, on the one 
hand, metaphysics and science and, on the other hand, pure and applied 
mathematics, with the metaphysician’s job being to provide a kind of conceptual 
apparatus required for undertaking scientific study. On the negative side, one cannot 
neglect to take seriously the fact that metaphysics invariably has epistemic aims, such 
as establishing facts about the nature of how the universe operates (whether it be the 
function of laws of nature, or the nature of time, space, causation, or even existence 
itself), and it is highly controversial to hold that we can achieve such epistemic aims 
from the armchair, divorced from empirical findings.  
 
We examine the metaphor of one discipline being ‘prior’ to the other in greater detail 
in section 3. Beforehand, in the next section, we shall see how the methodologies of 
science and metaphysics overlap though the shared use of non-empirical evaluative 
factors such as theory virtues, appeals to intuition, and the related use of modelling 
and inference to the best explanation.  
 
2. What	are	the	methodologies	of	science	and	metaphysics?	
Traditionally, science was taken to proceed by observation, intervention through 
experimentation, and logical forms of inference in order to form and test hypotheses. 
This positivist picture of science can hardly be considered adequate in describing 
science today, since these considerations cannot be seen as either necessary or 
sufficient for science. Scientists often need to choose between competing 
explanations of the same observations and the only way they can do so is by 
employing non-empirical factors in their decision making, such as aesthetic 
considerations like simplicity and elegance. As Pierre Duhem (1954) pointed out, 
when it comes to choosing between competing (empirically equivalent) hypotheses 
on non-empirical grounds, one runs into a meta-problem: having to choose which 
aesthetic virtue is to be prioritised and how it is to be defined. What ultimately 
determines the choice is the scientist’s intuition or ‘good sense’ (Ivanova 2010).  
 
Furthermore, hypotheses are often accepted within the scientific community despite 
the unavailability of empirical confirmation. This point is best illustrated within 
contemporary high energy physics in which theories are entertained by the 
community despite either making predictions that cannot be tested due to 
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technological constraints, or moreover failing to make specific predictions due to an 
overabundance of free variables within the theories, such as with multiverse 
cosmology and string theory (see Ellis & Silk (2014)). Such problems have led some to 
propose non-empirical accounts of theory assessment and confirmation within 
physics (most notably Dawid (2013), though see the collection of papers in Dawid, 
Thébault & Dardashti (2019)). Less controversially, physicists have historically placed a 
high degree of trust in scientific theories and hypotheses prior to empirical 
confirmation, such as with the Higgs mechanism prior to its famously complex 
empirical confirmation, and the atomic hypothesis prior to J.J. Thomson’s cathode ray 
experiments. In each case, the restricted availability of empirical tests has prompted 
the use of alternative non-empirical grounds for supporting a theory. Beauty, 
elegance, simplicity, unity, and coherence with other frameworks are among 
considerations widely employed by scientists in this regard, with not only pragmatic 
weight placed upon these factors, but also epistemic significance, since such 
considerations are often taken to justify belief in the truth of theories.3  
	
2.1. Use	of	theory	virtues	
Simplicity and parsimony have long been considered important elements in scientific 
reasoning. For instance, when discussing scientific methodology, Isaac Newton 
offered several Rules of Reasoning (or methods), with the first rule committing to 
parsimony:  
 
Rule I. No more causes of natural things should be admitted than are both true and 
sufficient to explain their phenomena. As the philosophers say: Nature does nothing 
in vain, and more causes are in vain when fewer suffice. For nature is simple and does 
not include in the luxury of superfluous causes.  (Newton 1999, P. 794)  
 
Simplicity was also used by Poincaré (2001[1902]) in his defence of Euclidean 
geometry in light of the underdetermination of physical geometry by experience. In 
the context of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, simplicity is often 
appealed to by defenders of the Everett interpretation insofar as unlike rival 
interpretations, such as collapse theories and the De Broglie–Bohm theory, it does 
not add extra mathematical structure or postulates to the orthodox quantum 
mechanics formalism.  On the contrary, defenders of rival interpretations standardly 
dismiss the Everett interpretation on the grounds of failing to be ontologically 																																																								
3 For a historical exploration of such attitudes, see Chandrasekhar (1987), McAllister (1996), Ivanova 
(2017), and Hossenfelder (2018).  
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parsimonious, since despite its lack of extra postulates, it is standardly taken to entail 
a branching multiverse with every possible measurement outcome actually occurring.  
 
Theory virtues play a central methodological role within metaphysics, with competing 
pictures of the world standardly evaluated with reference to their simplicity, 
parsimony, and fit with other metaphysical theories. For example, in ontology, trope 
theorists (such as Campbell (1990)) take their theory to be preferable to rival theories 
on grounds of simplicity, since it holds that there exist only tropes. Objects are 
understood as ontologically derivative bundles of tropes, being nothing over and 
above their constituting properties. For a trope theorist, there is nothing more to a 
tree than its particular colour, shape, length, weight and mass. Contrary to the 
minimal ontology postulated by trope theorists, Armstrong (1993) defends a two 
category ontology, which postulates both particulars and universals, and Lowe (2006) 
defends a four category ontology, which holds there to be two fundamental 
categories of particulars (objects and tropes) and two categories of universals (kinds 
and properties). Both Armstrong and Lowe argue that the various theoretical virtues 
of their theories with respect to trope theories, such as their explanatory power, 
outweigh the perceived vice of their respective lack of simplicity.   
 
The fact that both science and metaphysics employ theory virtues has been used as a 
reason to defend the legitimacy of metaphysics on methodological grounds as a 
means of establishing truths about the world. As L.A. Paul claims:  
 
The theoretical desiderata we use to choose a theory include simplicity, explanatory 
power, fertility, elegance, etc., and are guides to overall explanatory power and 
support inference to the truth of the theory. [... I]f the method can lead us to closer 
to the truth in science, it can lead us closer to the truth in metaphysics. (Paul 2012, p. 
21)  
 
On the other hand, Ladyman & Ross (2007) argue that the similarity of methods here 
instead has the consequence of making metaphysics pseudoscientific:  
 
Some metaphysicians have realized that they can imitate science by treating their 
kind of inquiry as the search for explanations[. ...] Taking the familiar explanatory 
virtues of unity, simplicity, non-ad hocness, and so on, they [...] argue with each other 
about whose particular metaphysical package scores highest on some loosely 
weighted vector of these virtues and requires the fewest unexplained explainers. On 
 7 
the basis of such reasoning, metaphysics is now often regarded as if it were a kind of 
autonomous special science, with its explananda furnished by the other sciences. 
(Ladyman & Ross 2007, p. 17, emphasis added)  
 
Ladyman (2012) is dismissive of such an approach at least in part because he sees 
theory virtues, in the spirit of Van Fraassen (1980), as being merely pragmatic devices 
for theory choice and not being concerned with truth per se, whereas metaphysics 
explicitly does aim at truth. An obvious rejoinder here is simply to hold that theory 
virtues are guides to truth, this being an attitude found not only within metaphysics 
but also in science. However, such a claim requires serious justification. Scientific 
realists have offered a number of arguments in defense of the idea that theory virtues 
can be indicators of truth, both a priori (Swinburne (1997)) and empirical arguments, 
often based on inferences from the history of science (McMullin (2009), Schindler 
(2018)), but these are not without problems. In particular, the a priori arguments 
often assume that nature itself is simple, making them circular, while empirical 
arguments suffer from being inconclusive, since inductive arguments from the history 
of science can be offered both in support of and against realism (Ivanova 
(forthcoming)). 
	
2.2. Use	of	intuitions	
 A further salient point of overlap between the methodologies of science and 
metaphysics is the use of intuition. In addition to weighing competing theories with 
respect to theory virtues, metaphysicians also appeal heavily to their intuitions, with 
‘intuitiveness’ commonly taken as a key desideratum in itself. For instance, adherents 
of the A-theory of time take it to be intuitive that time passes and that the distinction 
between past, present and future are mind-independent, with the B-theory’s 
rejection of these claims being highly counter-intuitive. Scientists are not immune to 
talking about the role of their intuitions, their aesthetic sensibility, and their intuitive 
sense. As mentioned above, Duhem claims that what resolves theory choice in 
science often is the ‘good sense’ of the scientists. The mathematician and scientist 
Henri Poincaré similarly argues that scientists use their aesthetic sensibility as a 
“delicate sieve” to select “the most elegant and beautiful combinations” that the 
mind produces (2001, 397). But can we reasonably claim that intuitions play the same 
role in science as in metaphysics?  
 
At first glance, intuitions appear to play a more central role in metaphysics than they 
do in science; after all, the scientist may appeal to experiment to test theories. Taking 
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this viewpoint, French and McKenzie (2015) claim there is a key asymmetry between 
the use of intuition in science and metaphysics:  
 
[I]n the scientific case, and arguably in [naturalistic metaphysics], the intuitions are 
functioning only as a starting point, a guide to what to try and justify by other means; 
by contrast in the [case of metaphysics] intuition itself has an essential justificatory 
role. (p. 29) 
 
Though there is certainly a lack of symmetry between the two cases, we take the 
asymmetry to be far less clear-cut; in particular, intuition is demonstrably used as a 
tool of justification within science. Being distrustful towards intuitions as a 
philosopher of science is of course well placed, since the history of science shows 
intuitions to routinely run counter to scientific discovery. But can we really appeal to 
the traditional distinction between context of discovery and context of justification to 
claim that intuitions, when used in science, are only relevant in the former context, 
while in metaphysics they are also crucial in the latter? We think that such an attitude 
does not do justice to much of what happens in science.  
 
Scientists, for better or worse, appeal to intuition not only to come up with 
hypotheses but also to justify their projects. They do so primarily in cases where there 
is insufficient empirical data to confirm or disconfirm the relevant theory. Poincaré 
claimed that the aesthetic intuition of scientists leads them to select the hypotheses 
that are most likely to be successful (Ivanova (2017)). Pierre Duhem argued that 
theory virtues cannot resolve theory choice, but rather it is the scientist’s good sense 
that selects the most fruitful theories. The Nobel laureate Subrahmanyan 
Chandrasekhar held that aesthetic intuition can play an epistemic role in science, 
noting that “we have evidence […] that a theory developed by a scientist, with an 
exceptionally well-developed aesthetic sensibility, can turn out to be true even if, at 
the time of its formulation, it appeared not to be so” (1987, 64).4 Aesthetic intuitions 
are commonly invoked in contemporary physics where theories are compared on 
grounds of naturalness, elegance and beauty (Green (1990), Chandrasekhar (1987), 
McAllister (1996), Ivanova (2017)). While it is doubtful whether our intuitions are any 
good at picking the right theory in advance of decisive empirical data, we cannot 
overlook the fact that scientists routinely employ intuitions to justify belief in a theory 
in the absence of empirical confirmation, and commonly take such intuitions to be a 																																																								
4 Chandrasekhar goes on: “[a]s Keats wrote a long time ago, “what the imagination seizes as beauty 
must be truth—whether it existed before or not” (1987, 64). 
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guide to the likelihood of a theory’s truth. In order to do justice to scientific practice, 
it is important to acknowledge that intuitions within science demonstrably go beyond 
the context of discovery. 
 
It is, of course, important to distinguish the descriptive aspect here from the 
normative. It is a matter of fact that many scientists do use intuition as a means of 
justification, but should they do so? A traditional approach to addressing this question 
is to look at the history of science and establish the track record of intuitive thinking: 
have intuitions led us down the right track or mostly taken us astray? It is well known 
that much of contemporary science is highly counterintuitive, and that many 
revolutionary theories were initially poorly received due to their lack of fit with 
received wisdom, whether this being because of the entrenchment of certain 
concepts within science (such as quantum mechanics overturning the determinism of 
classical physics) or the social restriction of religious dogma (such as with the 
Copernican revolution and Darwin’s theory of evolution by means of natural 
selection), but such examples are also exceptional cases that stand out for their 
conceptually revolutionary status; it does not follow that intuitions are of no use in 
the standard inferential practices central to the construction of theories and 
hypotheses.5 We take such track-record arguments to be inconclusive in resolving the 
normative question but take it that an independent justification is needed if any 
epistemic import is to be placed on one’s intuition.  
	
2.3. Modeling,	thought	experiments	and	modes	of	inferences	
While the use of intuition and theory virtues are two very clear examples of the 
overlapping methodologies of science and metaphysics, they are not the only cases. 
Metaphysicians and scientists also use similar forms of inference and modeling, such 
as the use of the imagination and thought experiments, the use of inference to the 
best explanation, and modeling by abstraction and idealization. Both scientists and 
metaphysicians employ the imagination and the construction of thought experiments. 
Descartes’ evil demon argument is a thought experiment that asks us to imagine what 
our experiences would be like were there no external world. Einstein’s elevator 
thought experiment asks us to imagine what our experience would be like were we 
subjected to (a) uniform upward acceleration in an elevator or (b) the gravitational 																																																								
5 The idea that intuition plays a largely reliable role in making scientific inferences from the data and 
forming new hypotheses, is of course distinct from the evidently false claim that contemporary 
scientific theories give a picture of the world that is ‘intuitive’, taken to mean ‘aligned with common 
sense’.  
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force in a stationary elevator, in order to argue for the equivalence principle. 
Poincare’s heat disk thought experiment (1902) asks us to imagine what our 
experience would be like were we living in a non-Euclidean disk exposed to non-
uniform heat forces in order to argue for the underdetermination of geometry by 
experience and to establish the legitimacy of non-Euclidean geometries. The use of 
the imagination to generate hypotheses and justify them is common practice in both 
science and metaphysics.6  
 
Furthermore, scientists as well as metaphysicians use inference to the best 
explanation (IBE) as a reliable form of reasoning. Scientists often explain the success 
of science by invoking IBE: an example is the predictive success of the atomic theory 
being explained by the fact that atoms are real, rather than fictitious, entities. 
Similarly, in metaphysics, Platonists invoke IBE to argue for the existence of abstract 
objects. The raspberries and strawberries in my breakfast bowl share something in 
common – they are all red. This fact cannot be explained, one may argue, unless we 
posit the property – redness – shared by these objects. Platonists argue that the best 
explanation for this resemblance is the existence of abstract objects.7 
  
A further related point of methodological overlap is the use of abstraction and 
idealisation in the creation of models. Abstraction and idealisation are common in 
science; we omit and simplify the systems we study in order to model them and make 
predictions, and we also introduce elements to the system that are factually 
incorrect. For instance, when we try to predict economic behaviour we use models 
that make certain assumptions about agents, by simplifying the parameters involved 
in making choices and assuming certain patterns of behaviour that do not correctly 
describe individual human behaviour. Paul (2012) sees the job of the metaphysician 
to be continuous with that of the scientist insofar as each uses abstraction and 
idealisation to model different ways the world could be. The advantage that science 
holds over metaphysics is that experience will eliminate a good number of 
competitors, while the metaphysician needs to rely on theoretical desiderata to 
choose between these competing models.    
 
																																																								
6 For further reading on the role of thought experiments in science, see Stuart (2016) and Salis & Frigg 
(forthcoming). 
7 For a recent examination on the relationship between IBE in science and metaphysics, see Saatsi 
(2017). 
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In summary, insofar as the practice of science routinely goes far beyond a strictly 
empirical method, there are many key points of overlap between the methodology of 
science and that of metaphysics. 
	
3. The	relationship	between	science	and	metaphysics	
Since there is a substantial overlap of the methodologies of science and metaphysics, 
appealing to methodology itself fails to provide a sharp demarcation between science 
and metaphysics. As with Venn diagrams, partial overlap does not entail 
indistinguishability; the empirical aspects of scientific methodology are sufficient to 
make key aspects of science distinct from metaphysics. However there is an 
asymmetry here insofar as the central methodological tools of metaphysics are also 
central to science. In light of this methodological overlap, this section considers the 
relationship between science and metaphysics in more detail. Metaphysics and 
science are often spoken of using the metaphor of a disciplinary hierarchy. First, it is 
often held by analytic metaphysicians (such as in the above quoted passage of E.J. 
Lowe) that metaphysics is conceptually prior to science through its wider, more 
general scope, and its concern with the basic conceptual tools used by science. 
Second, many naturalistic metaphysicians take the opposing point of view, such that 
metaphysics is secondary to science through its need to ‘keep up’ or ‘fit’ with the 
latest received wisdom within science, with science-free metaphysics being deemed 
as either limited to analytic questions that are not about the world per se, or else 
being an illegitimate means of addressing questions that ought to be informed by 
science.  
 
Can either of these offer a clear means of demarcating science from metaphysics? In 
this section, we see that the methodological overlap of science and metaphysics 
undercuts both avenues. First, the use of non-empirical methods within science 
includes the kind of self-reflective conceptual analysis common to metaphysics, 
undermining the idea that metaphysics is where concepts are formed and science 
where they are applied or tested. Second, science’s usage of non-empirical methods 
poses a problem for those inclined towards positivist, falsificationist, or pragmatist 
criticisms of metaphysics as meaningless, pointless, or simply less legitimate than 
science due to its non-empirical nature.  
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3.1. Is	metaphysics	conceptually	prior	to	science?	
Consider the characterisation offered by Paul (2012) that “metaphysics tries to tell us 
what laws, naturalness, properties, objects, persistence, and causal relations 
fundamentally are […] and science tries to discover which entities there are or how 
these natures are exemplified” (p. 6), and Morganti and Tahko’s (2017) related claim 
that metaphysics differs from science “in its greater generality and perhaps 
conceptual priority” and that “science represents at least an indirect ‘testing ground’ 
for metaphysical hypotheses, which thus get fleshed out, as it were, in the same 
process that employs them to provide an interpretation of our best scientific 
theories” (pp. 2560-1). This idea of a clear hierarchy of metaphysics as prior to 
science implies that science is not properly reflective on its own conceptual tools. To 
pick on just one example from many, we see that this is patently not the case with 
respect to causal relations in the case of physics. Much of the focus in quantum 
foundations since the publication of Bell’s theorems (1964, 1976) has been to reflect 
on what causal structure is, in order to understand how the non-local quantum 
correlations are to be explained, and indeed what is ultimately sufficient to provide a 
causal explanation in general, with the ultimate goal of utilising quantum causal 
relations for new technologies. Similarly, the task of unifying general relativity and 
quantum mechanics has forced theoreticians to query what space and time are, and 
whether spatiotemporal relations are properly fundamental or derivative of some 
deeper concepts. We could suppose that the researcher employed by the physics 
department becomes a de facto metaphysician when carrying out such inquiries, but 
this would appear to spin the facts to fit an inappropriate demarcation criterion.  
 
Rather, the general idea of the scientist requiring a set of well-defined metaphysical 
concepts and tools before getting to work overlooks the central task in foundational 
work within science, namely how to reflect upon and adjust key central theoretical 
terms, such as ‘time’, ‘space’ and ‘simultaneity’ (in the case of classical to relativistic 
physics), ‘motion’ (in the case of Aristotelian to Galilean physics), ‘cause’ and indeed 
even ‘reality’ and ‘identity’ (in the case of classical to quantum mechanics). These are 
all examples from physics, but that is not to pick out physics as a special case; one can 
find analogous examples throughout the sciences, such as ‘living’, and ‘individual’ in 
the case of biology.8 What we see routinely in the foundations of the sciences is a 
reflection of its practitioners upon the basic terms and concepts of inquiry in order to 
deal with well-confirmed anomalies in the data that fail to fit existing theory, or else 																																																								
8 For ‘living’, see Machery (2012); for ‘individual’, see Clarke (2010). 
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deal with the problem of unifying accepted but prima facie incompatible theories (as 
with general relativity and quantum theory). As such, the conceptual priority of 
metaphysics is in danger of being overstated: it is central to scientific methodology to 
perform the kind of key conceptual analysis that metaphysicians aim to do, and this is 
invariably done in response to empirical findings.  
 
This is not simply a point about the tendency of scientists to effectively ‘do 
metaphysics’, but more importantly concerns the epistemology of the kind of 
concepts used in science. Very often, physics (to pick again on a preferred example) 
requires us to consider possibilities not seriously entertained or explored by 
metaphysics, not least due to their unintuitiveness, such as the inertial-frame-
dependence of simultaneity employed to understand the nature of light in special 
relativity, the lack of definiteness of properties of subatomic particles between 
measurements in order to explain their motion in quantum mechanics, and the use of 
non-Euclidean geometry to understand the gravitational force in general relativity. To 
pick on the latter point in a bit more detail: there was a long debate within philosophy 
concerning the status of Euclidean geometry given that some of its axioms, 
particularly the ‘parallel postulate’, fail to have the status of logical truths. On this 
point, Schopenhauer (1966 [1819], p. 130) held that “this truth is supposed to be too 
complicated to pass as self-evident, and therefore needs a proof; but no such proof 
can be produced, just because there is nothing more immediate,” comparing the 
parallel postulate to the principle of contradiction. The fact that not only were 
consistent non-Euclidean geometries formulated but that they later proved useful in 
accounting for physical forces demonstrates that armchair reasoning about 
metaphysical possibilities can be less general and more restrictive than it may initially 
appear. It is often the empirical method of science, namely the existence of data that 
fails to fit existing theories, that forces us to take seriously possibilities that may not 
have been entertained as metaphysically possible, with this empirical grounding of 
conceptual analysis playing a key epistemic and motivational role in our 
understanding of central concepts within scientific theories. As such, when 
conceptual apparatus is most needed within science, namely in the foundations of 
new theories, the data often plays a crucial role in the development and application 
of concepts, and as such this undermines the idea of metaphysics alone putting in the 
‘background’ needed for science to proceed. 
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3.2. Is	metaphysics	less	legitimate	than	science?	
Finally, metaphysics has historically been demarcated from science through being a 
less legitimate discipline, whether it being due to having the hopeless epistemic aim 
of achieving synthetic a priori knowledge (as the empiricists would have it), of being 
concerned with meaningless pseudo-questions (as the positivists would have it), of 
being merely untestable (as the falsificationists would have it), or merely of having no 
practical relevance (as the pragmatists would have it). More recently, we see 
Ladyman and Ross (2007) hold that much of analytic metaphysics “fails to qualify as 
part of the enlightened pursuit of objective truth, and should be discontinued” (p. vii) 
through its failure to meet the science-first ideal of naturalistic metaphysics. But 
there are clearly questions studied by metaphysicians on which science doesn’t 
reasonably bear, and which we have no particularly strong reason to regard as 
somehow constituting illegitimate intellectual inquiry. So long as the metaphysician 
does not have immodest epistemic aims and is not under the illusion that their inquiry 
is sufficient to uncover some deep, synthetic facts about the world, then it seems 
reasonable to consider scientifically-uninformed metaphysical inquiry into issues like 
the special composition problem (van Inwagen (1990)), or the conceivability of 
backwards causation (Dummett (1954; 1964), Black (1956)), as analogous to pure 
mathematics.  
 
Such a picture is endorsed by French and McKenzie (2012), naturalistic 
metaphysicians who defend the legitimacy of analytic metaphysics, in part because 
the latter can and often does prove useful to the former. This way of seeing the role 
of metaphysics is analogous to other theoretical endeavours: just as mathematicians 
come up with different theoretical frameworks, some of which can find their 
application in science (non-Euclidean geometries, knot theory), such might be the 
fate of many projects of analytic metaphysics, making them legitimate as potential 
scientific tools. Of course, much of the subject matter of this kind of metaphysics may 
be of little to no intrinsic interest to the scientist, the philosopher of science, nor 
indeed the naturalistic metaphysician, but this lack of intrinsic interest does not 
amount to a lack of legitimacy of analytic metaphysics.9  
 
Potential usefulness, however, is a low bar. Though legitimate, many of the questions 
tackled in the field of analytic metaphysics may be reasonably deemed ‘pointless’, as 																																																								
9 Indeed, Ladyman (2012) acknowledges this epistemically modest picture of metaphysics as not 
intrinsically worthless, but rather as less sure-footed than other a priori disciplines such as pure 
mathematics or logic due to the metaphysics’ lack of an analogous notion of proof.   
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Ladyman and Ross (pp. 29—30) note, in the spirit of the pragmatist C.S. Peirce, on the 
grounds that they venture far outside what can in principle be tested. In contrast, 
scientific hypotheses, in the spirit of Popper, are standardly characterised as in-
principle testable, or at least are sufficiently connected to the concept of 
experimental testing, and as such are not pointless. Can we then suppose that this is a 
key mark of discernibility between metaphysics and science; that the kinds of 
questions asked by the latter are not pointless? Ultimately, the methodological 
overlaps between science and metaphysics we have highlighted, specifically the 
widespread usage of non-empirical methodologies in science, once more undercut 
this putative means of demarcation. This turns out to be a key issue in the case of so-
called ‘post-empirical’ science, namely those research programs of theoretical physics 
that fail to make empirically testable predictions, with string theory and multiverse 
cosmology being prime examples (Ellis & Silk, 2014). A central question in this regard 
is whether post-empirical science deserves its name: has theoretical physics reached 
the point at which large parts of it no longer constitute science at all? What exactly is 
the alternative: to dismiss such research as non-scientific, or as merely pointless, 
speculative science, or simply as metaphysics?  There is the significant worry here 
that one is merely left playing with semantics. What is relevant is that empirically-
driven scientific discourse invariably has and does venture outside what can 
ultimately be tested, that non-empirical methods are for that reason a key tool within 
science, and hence that scientific methodology can overlap significantly with that of 
metaphysics, making it hard to delegitimise metaphysics on grounds of methodology 
without also condemning much of science.10 
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